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subcontractor and his materialman are joint payees, and no agreement exists with the
owner or general contractor as to allocation of proceeds, the materialman by endorsing
the check will be deemed to have received the money due him." Post Bros. Constr. Co.
v. Yoder, 569 P.2d 133, 135 (Cal. 1977). It does not, however, impose an absolute bar on
a materialman's recovery for any and all joint check proceeds that the materialman does
not retain. As pointed out by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the "crucial question"
regarding the joint check rule's applicability is "what is 'the money due him' which the
materialman is deemed to have received." See Medford Sch. Dist. No. 549C ex rel. N.
Coast Elec. Co. v. Peterson & Jones Commercial Constr., Inc., 708 P.2d 623, 625 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985) (emphasis added). The "money due" the materialman "refers, not to all
money which may ultimately be due, but only to the money due as of the date the check
covers." See id.; see also Iowa Supply Co. v. Grooms & Co. Constr., 428 N.W.2d 662,
666 (Iowa 1988) ("This rule only bars claims against the maker of the check for the
money due from a subcontractor up to the date of the check and up to the amount of the
check." (emphasis added)). It is for that reason that "the question of whether a joint
check constitutes payment of the amount owed by the subcontractor to the lower-tier
subcontractor is a question of fact based upon the intention of the parties." Slee AAA
Cabinets & Millwork, Inc. v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 130 P.3d 887, 892 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2006).
Here, although Atlas had received materials for the Matheson Junior High School
Project (the "Project") whose invoiced value equaled or exceeded the full amount of the
November 13, 2001, joint check, the $34,259.43 portion that QED allowed Atlas to retain
was not yet due. The terms of Atlas's account with QED required Atlas to pay for the
3

product it received on or before the last day of the month following the month in which it
received the product. (See PA-6,2 QED 0001-0059; PA-4, QED 0060-0061; R.
2221:316-317, 446-47.) The trial court expressly found that "[u]nder the terms of
QED's agreement with Atlas, as of November 19, 2001, Atlas was only past due for the
invoices issued through September 30, 2001, which totaled $51,123.76 [the amount of the
November 13, 2001, joint check retained by QED]." (R. 2134 f 53.) USF&G has not
challenged this finding. Thus, although Atlas's account balance for the Project equaled
or exceeded the full amount of the November 13, 2001, joint check, $34,259.43 of that
check was simply not "money due" or past due. (R. 2220:211.) Simply put, on
November 13, 2001, QED could not have recovered the $34,259.43 in a collection action
against Atlas and was not legally entitled to demand that portion of the November 13,
2001, joint check proceeds. The joint check rule is therefore inapplicable to this case,
and no basis exists in fact or law for this Court to adopt it.
3. If Adopted, the Joint Check Rule Should Not Be Given Retroactive
Application.
To the extent that the Court is inclined to consider arguments with regard to the
joint check rule, and to the extent the Court is inclined to adopt the joint check rule as the
law of Utah, that rule should not be applied retroactively to this case. Although judicial
decisions generally have retroactive effect, retroactive application "is not invariable,"
Van Dyke v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991), and "the extent of [a]
decision's application is left to the discretion of the court." In re Loyal Order of Moose,
2

The trial court's exhibits were denoted by a designation of "PA" for "Plaintiff and
"DA" for "Defendant" along with an exhibit number. For consistency purposes, the trial
exhibits are referred to herein as they were at trial, i.e., "PA-1" for Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit 1.
4

#259 v. County Bd. Of Equalizations, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982). Indeed,
retroactive application of a judicial decision "depends solely upon an appraisal of the
relevant judicial policies to be advanced." See Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A court may decline to allow a new decision to apply retroactively where "there has been
justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law or [where] the retroactive operation of the
new law may otherwise create an undue burden." Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1025.
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly declined to give retroactive effect to
decisions with certain import. For instance, in Timpanogos Planning & Water
Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, the Utah Supreme
Court held that because certain water districts had "in good faith relied upon [the existing
state of the law] in conducting their business for several decades," it "would work an
injustice to cast a cloud upon the legality of their operations during those many years."
690 P.2d 562, 572 (Utah 1984). Moreover, in Loyal Order of Moose, #259, the Supreme
Court noted that "if the rule [in question] were to be given retroactive effect, the
assessment of back taxes on properties affected by this rule might well result in an
unreasonable burden upon all those organizations and governmental bodies associated
with it." 657 P.2d at 265. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court has been decidedly
reluctant to give its decisions retroactive effect where the parties would sustain undue
burden and injustice. Indeed, one of the very purposes of the law is to provide a steady
standard to which individuals and entities may conform so as to avoid liability and loss.
See Black's Law Dictionary 884-85 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "law" as "[t]he regime that
orders human activities and relations").
5

Here, a retroactive imposition of the joint check rule would unduly burden QED
and every other materials supplier that relies on the absence of the joint check rule's
bright line rule of automatic forfeiture. Materialmen supply materials to subcontractors
every day, and "[t]he use of joint checks in this type of situation is well established in the
construction industry." Iowa Supply Co., 428 N.W.2d at 666. To impose the joint check
rule in this case would result in an unjust, undue burden on QED and every other
materials supplier who has relied status of the law in Utah regarding joint checks.
Moreover, the joint check rule is in direct conflict with the general law of waiver
in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "there is only one legal standard
required to establish waiver under Utah law. . . . T o constitute waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it.'" Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah
1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (Utah
1936)). In this case—and presumably in other cases as well—QED allowed Atlas to
temporarily retain $34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001, joint check proceeds based only
on its belief that no bright-line estoppel rule existed in Utah that would penalize it for
doing so. If QED had known that its mere allowance of Atlas to retain the $34,259.43
portion of that check would categorically forfeit its rights in that amount, QED could
have made other arrangements with Atlas. But, relying on the absence of an automatic
forfeiture rule, QED honored its agreement with Atlas and allowed Atlas to wait to pay
the $34,259.43 amount until those invoices actually came due. Retroactive application of
the joint check rule would therefore unfairly penalize QED. And, given the established
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use of joint checks under these circumstances in Utah, QED is not the only materials
supplier that would suffer from retroactive adoption of the joint check rule.
B.

The Trial Court's Application of Equitable Estoppel Principles Was an
Abuse of Discretion.
1. QED Has Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Support of the
Findings of Fact It Challenges.

Contrary to USF&G's argument, QED properly marshaled the evidence in support
of the findings of fact it challenges. Despite the strictness of the marshaling requirement,
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appellant challenging a finding of
fact "first marshal [only] all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court's interpretations of Rule
24(a)(9) emphasize that an appellant must marshal only evidence in support of the
specific finding it challenges. See, e.g., State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 12 ("[P]arties
challenging the facts under a clear error standard have a judicially imposed obligation to
marshal the evidence in support of the challenged finding." (emphasis added)); United
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, If 26, 140
P.3d 1200 (noting that an appellant "must demonstrate how the court found the facts from
the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the
evidence" (emphasis added) (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1f 78, 100 P.3d
1177)).
QED challenges only certain, narrow aspects of two findings of fact. Those
findings of fact are as follows, set forth precisely as QED set them forth in its opening
brief:

7

•

In exchange for Atlas'[s] payment of $51,123.76 on or about November 19,
2001, which satisfied all amounts owed to QED for the materials and
supplies QED furnished for the Project through September 30, 2001, QED
allowed Atlas to retain the balance of $34,259.43 provided by the
November 13, 2001 joint check. (R. 2134 ^ 52 (emphasis added).)

•

Notwithstanding QED's belief that Atlas did not yet owe the remaining
$34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001 joint check, and that QED, therefore,
could not retain that money, in fact, the total of the [ujnpaid [i]nvoices
[(PA-6, QED 0001-0059) (the "Unpaid Invoices")] on Atlas'[s] account for
the Project (even after applying the $51,123.76 payment) equaled at least
the remaining balance of the November 13, 2001 joint check—$34,259.43.
(R. 2134 f 54 (emphasis added).)

QED purposefully emphasized certain words in its recitation of the trial court's findings
in order to define the narrow parameters of its two challenges to those findings.
Specifically, QED challenges only the trial court's findings that: (1) QED, at its option,
"allowed" Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check proceeds, which implies that QED
had the choice to do so; and (2) that QED believed that Atlas did not yet "owe" the
remaining portion of the November 13, 2001, joint check to QED. Thus, QED was only
required to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that QED possessed
other options but "allowed" Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check, and that QED
believed that Atlas did not yet owe it the remainder of the November 13, 2001, joint
check.
To satisfy Rule 24(a)(9)'s marshaling requirement, QED noted the subsidiary
findings upon which the trial court based the above-referenced findings. (R. 2132 ^[ 41—
62.) QED then listed, in detail and complete with citations to the record, all of the
evidence presented by either QED or USF&G at trial that supported the trial court's
findings. (See Br. of Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 30-31.) QED then demonstrated
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that this evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. QED therefore
scrupulously complied with Rule 24(a)(9)'s marshaling requirement. See Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9); Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 76.
Completely ignoring the narrowness of QED's two factual findings, USF&G
faults QED's marshaling on the ground that it omits a number of purportedly important
bits of evidence presented at trial. Given the narrowness of those two challenges, QED
simply was not required to marshal the vast spectrum of evidence USF&G proposes,
namely, evidence surrounding another, unrelated joint check; USF&G's efforts to
ascertain its account balance by communicating with QED; invoices outstanding on the
date of the November 13, 2001, joint check; and Atlas's payment practices. None of that
evidence has anything to do with QED's narrow challenges to the trial court's findings
regarding its intent in permitting Atlas to retain the balance of the joint check or whether
QED believed that Atlas "owed" QED anything.3 Thus, QED was not required to
marshal that evidence.
Of course, all evidence presented at a trial is interconnected in some way or
another. But that does not mean that an appellee may defeat an appellant's challenge to a
finding of fact simply by pointing to any shred of evidence presented at trial and arguing
that the appellant failed to marshal it. If that were so, the findings of fact in a case of any
degree of complexity—like this one—would be virtually unassailable, regardless of how
3

Of course, the upshot of QED's challenges to the trial court's factual findings is that
QED was not legally entitled to proceeds of the November 13, 2001, joint check that
were not yet due. Moreover, QED believed that it could not retain the remaining
$34,259.43 portion of the November 13, 2001, joint check because the remaining unpaid
invoices on Altas's account for the Project were not yet due, not that Atlas did not owe
QED that amount. QED has never maintained that Atlas was not obligated to eventually
pay the invoices that were outstanding but not yet due as of November 13, 2001.
9

unsupported they are. An appellant could only satisfy the marshaling requirement by
marshaling all evidence presented at trial. Such a rule would fly in the face of
fundamental appellate rules such as page limits. See Utah R. App. P. 24(f) (imposing
page limits on briefs); id 24(h) (noting that motions for leave to file an overlength brief
are "disfavored"). That is not the kind of marshaling the Utah courts require.
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that the marshaling rule is not as
hypertechnical as USF&G characterizes it. In Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Court recognized that the marshaling requirement
is but a "tool pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on the parties an obligation to
assist them in conducting a whole record review." 2007 UT 42, ^ 19, 578 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20. The Court took pains to emphasize that even if an appellant fails entirely to
marshal, the appellate court "retains discretion to consider independently the whole
record and determine if the decision below has adequate factual support." Id. If 20.
Although QED fully complied with the marshaling requirement, the Supreme Court's
message is clear: the marshaling requirement is not intended to be a mechanism for
disposing of legitimate challenges to factual findings through overreaching extensions of
technicalities like those advanced by USF&G.
In sum, QED complied with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(9) and marshaled all
the requisite evidence in support of the narrow factual findings it challenges.
2. The Findings of Fact Upon Which the Trial Court Relied Are
Clearly Erroneous.
The trial court committed clear error finding that QED "allowed" Atlas to retain
$34,259.43 of the $85,383.19 joint check in the "belief9 that Atlas did not "owe" that
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amount to QED at the time the $85,383.19 joint check was negotiated. Evidence
presented at trial does not support the trial court's finding that Atlas was due or past due
on its account terms with QED for materials furnished to the Project in an amount greater
than the $51,123.76 at the time the $85,383.19 joint check was issued, and that QED
intended to waive payment for the remaining $34,259.43 that it allowed Atlas to retain.
First, with respect to the trial court's finding that QED did not believe that Atlas
owed QED the $34,259.43, the evidence establishes only that QED had invoiced Atlas
for product supplied by QED for the Project and that Atlas was obligated to pay those
invoices in accordance with the terms of its contract with QED. (R. 2220:219-20.)
Furthermore, trial testimony demonstrates that the term "net-30," as used on the Unpaid
Invoices, was clearly understood by Atlas and QED to provide up to sixty days after the
issuance of the invoice for Atlas to make its payments. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557.)
Thus, when QED invoiced Atlas, that invoice was not past due, and payment was not
required for up to 60 days, depending on when the invoice was issued. Furthermore, each
unpaid invoice contained a payment reminder at the bottom left corner that confirmed the
actual due date of the invoice. (R. 2220:212, 217; 2221:446-47.) There is simply no
evidence whatsoever that QED had any right to demand payment for amounts owed, but
not yet due, under the terms of Atlas's account. The trial court's apparent reliance on
evidence that the entirety of the November 13, 2001, joint check was due or past due,
where there is no such evidence, is against "clear weight of the evidence" and therefore
"clearly erroneous." See Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d
676, 678 (Utah 1997).

11

Second, with respect to the trial court's finding that QED chose to allow Atlas to
keep the $34,259.43, as if QED had a choice, the only evidence presented at trial by
either party demonstrates that QED was obligated to allow Atlas to retain the portion of
the $85,383.19 joint check if Atlas demanded such. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557, 595.)
As set forth above, QED could not legally force Atlas to allow QED to retain the
$34,259.43 portion of the joint check. Given that Atlas's remaining unpaid invoices were
not yet due or past due, QED had no legal right to demand the full amount of the joint
check proceeds. The trial court's finding to the contrary is against the "clear weight of
the evidence" and "clearly erroneous." Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678. Because the trial
court's equitable estoppel ruling hinges on two clearly erroneous findings of fact, it must
be reversed. Cf Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f 55, 150 P.3d 480 (noting, in the
context of Rule 60(b) motions that "[i]f a district court's ruling . . . is based on clearly
erroneous factual findings . . . the district court has likely abused its discretion").
3. Equitable Estoppel Is Inappropriate in this Case Because USF&G
Failed to Meet Its Evidentiary Burden for Proving Equitable
Estoppel.
Quite apart from its reliance on clearly erroneous findings of fact, the trial court
abused its discretion because USF&G failed to meet its burden to present evidence at trial
sufficient to establish estoppel. Cf Bolitho v. East 143 P. 584, 588 (Utah 1914)
(reversing a trial court's equitable estoppel ruling in part because "the evidence was not
competent to establish an estoppel"). Specifically, equitable estoppel should not have
been applied in this case because USF&G presented no evidence that: (a) QED did not
act in a manner inconsistent with its payment bond claim; (b) QED's endorsement of the
$85,383.19 joint check was enough to constitute waiver of QED's bond claim; (c)
12

Comtrol's reliance on QED's endorsement of the $85,383.19 joint check was reasonable;
(d) Comtrol properly ascertained the amount QED was due when it issued the $85,383.19
joint check; and (e) QED's course of dealing with Atlas uniquely defined "net-30."
a) QED has not acted in a manner inconsistent with its payment
bond claim.
USF&G failed to present any evidence at trial demonstrating that QED has been
inconsistent in asserting its payment bond claim. It presented no evidence demonstrating
that QED agreed to bear the risk of non-payment and waive its bond claim by allowing
Atlas to retain $34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001 joint check proceeds. Moreover, it
presented no evidence demonstrating that QED intended to waive its right to payment of
the invoices—which could have been covered by the $34,259.43—by not demanding
payment for those invoices until they were actually due. QED, on the other hand,
presented evidence at trial demonstrating that it adhered to all the statutory requirements
in asserting its bond claim. (R. 2220:17; PA-1.)
b) The simple act of endorsing the $85,383.19 joint check is
insufficient to bar QED's payment bond claim.
Even if QED represented to USF&G that the $85,383.19 joint check was equal to
an amount owed by Atlas, USF&G presented no evidence establishing that QED intended
its endorsement of that check to be a waiver of its right against the payment bond posted
for the Project (the "Bond") in the event of non-payment by Atlas. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d
Estoppel & Waiver § 46 (2006) (requiring intent before applying equitable estoppel as a
defense to a claim). In fact, QED did not knowingly or otherwise waive its right to
payment from the Bond of the invoices that would have been paid in part or in full by the
portion of the $85,383.19 joint check QED allowed Atlas to keep.
13

In Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., 385 P.2d 982 (Utah
1963), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a construction materials supplier received
payments for "more than it was legally entitled to at that time," a promise to waive its
rights to future claims or liens "would be without consideration." Id. at 984. Therefore,
even an attempt by QED to waive its rights against the Bond for the full amount of the
$85,383.19 would be without consideration and unenforceable. USF&G presented no
evidence that QED represented that it would waive any claim against the Bond if Atlas
failed to pay for the materials QED supplied to the Project. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989) (concluding that estoppel was
inappropriate because the supplier never expressly waived its rights against the Bond).
Nor did it present any evidence demonstrating that QED intended to waive its bond claim
by the simple act of endorsing a joint check. See Clark-Fontana Paint Co. v. Glassman
Constr. Co., 397 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1968) (rejecting argument that by signing joint checks
with conspicuous waiver language that a supplier had waived its lien rights).
Moreover, contrary to USF&G's argument, USF&G presented no evidence
establishing that QED knew anything about the $94,116.55 joint check until Comtrol
called and asked QED whether it had received that joint check. (R. 2220:223.)
Similarly, it presented no evidence that even implies that QED knew that Comtrol was
"greatly concerned" by Atlas's retention of the $94,116.55 joint check or that Comtrol
made it clear to QED that it was going to issue the $85,383.19 joint check and that the
entire check was intended for QED.
Moreover, the record affirmatively establishes that Comtrol could have done more
to ascertain the actual amounts due QED at the time it issued the $85,383.19 joint check.
14

(R. 2222:637-41.) The consequences of its failure to do so should not be borne by QED.
QED simply responded to Comtrol's generalized, blanket inquiry into the outstanding
balance owed by Atlas. USF&G offered no evidence that QED attempted to lead
Comtrol astray or represented intent to look to Atlas directly for payment.
The fact that QED retained only that portion of the $85,383.19 joint check that
Atlas was contractually obligated to pay does not constitute waiver under the
circumstances of this case. See Soter's, Inc., 857 P.2d at 942 (setting forth the "only . . .
legal standard required to establish waiver under Utah law"). On the contrary, the only
finding supported by the record is that QED did not waive its right to assert a claim
against the Bond for the full value of the materials furnished to the Project.
c) Comtrors reliance on QED's endorsement of the $85,383.19
joint check was unreasonable.
Although the lien waivers may have related to different payments for the Project,
the trial court's conclusion that Comtrol's reliance on those lien waivers was
unreasonable demonstrates the implausibility of relying on a simple act of endorsing a
joint check as a waiver of a portion QED's bond claim. The record does not support the
application of equitable estoppel because if USF&G's reliance on QED's lien waivers
was unreasonable (R. 2135 ]f 58; R. 2225:16), USF&G certainly was not entitled to rely
on a response by QED to Comtrol's general inquiry regarding Atlas's account balance.
Moreover, in presenting its ruling, the trial court stated that in light of the "sophisticated
operation and the [joint] checks" used in this case, USF&G's reliance on the joint checks
was not reasonable. (R. 2225:15-16, attached to QED's opening brief as Addendum A.)
Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that by virtue of
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allowing Atlas to temporarily retain the $34,259.43—which was payable but not yet
due—QED should be estopped from recovering that amount.
d) Comtrol is responsible for its own negligence in failing to
ascertain the amount actually owed to QED.
The very purpose of payment bond statutes is to shift the risk of non-payment
away from suppliers (like QED) to general contractors and their sureties (like USF&G).
See Krupp Steel Prods., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1987); see also
Geneva Pipe Co. v. Maughan, 714 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Utah 1986) ("The risk of loss . . . is
one of the hazards which a surety, for a fixed consideration assumes by its contract."
(quoting Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 249 P. 810, 814 (Utah 1926))). The trial court's
erroneous findings of fact effectively shift that risk of non-payment back to QED, forcing
QED to bear the loss resulting from Comtrol and USF&G's own failure to ascertain the
amounts due QED.
The record affirmatively establishes that Comtrol failed to accurately determine
the amount actually due QED when Comtrol issued the $85,383.19 joint check. The
record further affirmatively establishes that Comtrol could have ascertained the exact
amount due QED, but did not. (R. 2222:637-41.) See Syro Steel Co. v. Hubbell
Highway Signs, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 208, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that one of the
elements of equitable estoppel is that the asserting party lack knowledge "and the means
to acquire knowledge as to the real facts in question" (emphasis added)). Accordingly,
Comtrol and its surety, USF&G, are responsible for their failure to ascertain or
understand the terms of Atlas's account with QED, and the trial court abused its
discretion when it made QED "responsible for monitoring its purchaser, rather than
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making [Comtrol] responsible for monitoring its subcontractor." See Krupp Steel Prods.,
831 F.2d at 983 n.3; see also Geneva Pipe, 714 P.2d at 651 (discussing the "ample
facilities" sureties have for protecting themselves as opposed to a supplier's general
inability to monitor relationships with customers).
e) QED's course of dealing with Atlas uniquely defined "net30".
The uncontroverted terms of Atlas's account with QED specifically defined
Atlas's payment obligation to require Atlas to pay invoices on the last day of the month
following the month during which QED's invoice was issued. (R. 2132 ^J 41; PA-4.) The
payment terms between QED and Atlas involved numerous occasions for performance by
both. (Id.) Both Atlas and QED had knowledge of the nature of the performance, the
opportunity to object to the arrangement, and an implicit understanding that the
construction of the agreement and course of performance were reasonable. (R. 2132 ^f
42.) All these factors are relevant to the meaning of the agreement between Atlas and
QED and undisputedly point to the conclusion that the agreement required that payment
be made on the last date of the month following the month in which the materials were
furnished. (R. 2220:132-133; 2221:267-282.) The evidence submitted at trial regarding
this critical term is compelling and virtually uncontested.
4. Utah's Payment Bond Statute Provides Special Protection to QED.
In its reply brief, USF&G concedes that payment bond statutes are to be liberally
construed, but it argues that this liberal construction is "not without limits." (See Reply
Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 24.) However, USF&G does not say what
those limitations are, nor could it: the only "limitation" on the liberal construction
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afforded to payment bond statutes is the language of those statutes. See J.W. Bateson Co.
v. United States, 434 U.S. 586, 594 (1978) (noting that the rule of liberal construction
"does not justify ignoring plain words of limitation" (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States ex rel. B. & R., Inc. v. Donald Lane Constr., 19 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223-24
(D. Del. 1998) (noting consensus that notice provisions are an exception to the rule of
liberal construction because "the remedial purposes of the Miller Act will not justify
ignoring clear limitations imposed by the statute" (emphasis added)). That limitation
does not provide Comtrol or USF&G the protection they seek. Utah's payment bond
statute unambiguously allows QED to recover against the Bond "for any unpaid amount
due" it. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis added). The liberal construction
for which QED advocates is totally consistent with the language of the bond statute, and
the "limitations" USF&G places upon that construction are illusory.
No other reason exists to depart from the liberal construction normally afforded to
payment bond statutes. Despite USF&G's contention, the trial court's estoppel decision
will have little bearing on the veracity of communications between suppliers and general
contractors. However, it will profoundly restrict the ability of suppliers to assert claims
against payment bonds. Indeed, at the very least, the trial court's reduction of QED's
claim significantly weakens the very purpose of the payment bond statute, namely, to
ensure payment to those supplying labor and materials to public projects. See Am. Sur.
Co. of N.Y. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958) (noting that the purpose of the
Miller Act is to "shift the ultimate risk of nonpayment from workmen and suppliers to the
surety"); see also W. Coatings v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1990)
(noting the many similarities between the Miller Act and Utah's payment bond statute).
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At trial, USF&G offered no evidence that QED was anything but forthright in responding
to Comtrol's inquiries regarding Atlas's account balance. More importantly, in spite of
USF&G's efforts to represent otherwise, USF&G offered no evidence—and the trial
court did not make any findings that would support such a contention—that QED
attempted to lead Comtrol astray and then attempted to "benefit financially from [its] lack
of candor." (See Reply Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 24.)
5. Appellate Courts in Utah and Across the Country Have Rejected
the Application of Equitable Estoppel as a Defense to Payment
Bond Claims In Situations Similar to This Case.
Finally, the cases cited by QED in its opening brief are just a representative
sampling of the cases throughout the United States—and in particular, Utah—where
appellate courts have rejected the application of equitable estoppel as a defense to
payment bond claims in situations similar to this case. The status of the law of equitable
estoppel in Utah was made clear in CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., where the
Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's application of equitable estoppel as a defense
to a payment bond claim. 772 P.2d at 970-71. Despite USF&G's argument to the
contrary, CECO is not distinguishable. The fact that the supplier in CECO contacted the
general contractor to advise it that the supplier had not been paid for work on a project is
of no consequence and does not distinguish CECO. Instead, it actually highlights the
inappropriateness of applying equitable estoppel in this case. If equitable estoppel was
not an appropriate defense in CECO—where the sub-subcontractor made representations
that it would continue to look to its customer for payment—it is certainly not appropriate
here, where QED simply responded to Comtrol's general inquiry regarding the amount
owed on Atlas's account and honored the terms of its agreement with Atlas. (R.
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2220:213-14; 2222:589.) In CECO, the supplier represented to the general contractor
that it would "continue to look to the subcontractor for payment," but no such
representation was made in this case.
Furthermore, QED never communicated an intention to waive its right to assert a
claim against the Bond, and there is no evidence on the record that Comtrol gave
"specific instructions to QED and Atlas that the full amount of the check was for QED."
(Reply Br. of Appellants & Br. of Cross-Appellees at 25.) This reality is perhaps best
illustrated by USF&G's recitation of "facts" that it believes surround the issuance of the
$85,383.19 joint check. (See kL at 12-13.) USF&G goes to great lengths to recite all the
"facts" surrounding the issuance of the $85,383.19 joint check, but it conspicuously omits
any record citation to support its contention that Comtrol gave "specific instructions to
QED and Atlas that the full amount of the check was for QED." (Id at 25.)
Here, just as in CECO, the general contractor issued joint checks in an effort to
ensure payment to the supplier. This Court should therefore follow the Utah Supreme
Court's lead in CECO and adhere to the important public policy underlying the payment
bond statute. To do otherwise would produce a "ludicrous result," namely, one that
"make[s] it rather easy for general contractors to avoid their statutory obligation to
provide assurances that their subcontractors will pay their bills." CECO, 772 P.2d at 970.
That kind of unfairness should not be countenanced with an equitable estoppel ruling.
Additionally, USF&G's theory, if adopted, provides an avenue for general contractors to
shift the risk of non-payment from themselves to suppliers. Such a result is contrary to
Utah's payment bond statute, waiver doctrine, and general principles of equity and
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fairness. See Krupp Steel Prods., 831 F.2d at 983 n.3; see also Geneva Pipe, 714 P.2d at
651.
In this case, QED furnished materials to a public project for which it has not been
paid. And, as in CECO, QED attempted to work with its customer (Atlas) to procure
payment for its materials furnished to the Project. The only distinction between this case
and CECO is that QED did not contact Comtrol, that QED always looked to Atlas for
payment rather than to Comtrol, and that QED responded to Comtrol's general inquiry
regarding the status of Atlas's account. When Atlas failed to pay QED in full, QED
asserted a statutorily authorized claim against the Bond, which was posted to guarantee
payment for all those furnishing labor and materials to the Project. Accordingly, the trial
court abused its discretion by estopping QED from recovering the full amount of its
payment bond claim. This Court should remand to the trial court with instructions that
the trial court amend QED's judgment and award QED an additional $34,259.43, plus
pre- and post-judgment interest.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE TRIAL COURT'S
CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
AWARD QED ALL OF ITS FEES.
USF&G does not appear to dispute that if this Court concludes that the trial court

abused its discretion by estopping QED from claiming the additional $34,259.43 that
Atlas withheld from the November 13, 2001, joint check, the Court should remand the
trial court's calculation of attorneys' fees with instructions to award QED all of its
attorneys' fees. Indeed, it could not dispute that outcome. As noted in QED's initial
brief, Utah courts employ a "flexible and reasoned approach" to determine which party in
litigation is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. See Mountain
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States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Employing that
"flexible and reasoned approach," the trial court concluded that QED was the prevailing
party, and USF&G does not dispute that conclusion. But the trial court must also employ
some flexibility and reason when calculating the amount of attorneys' fees to which a
prevailing party is entitled. Specifically, the court must consider certain "established
touchstones" when calculating the amount of fees. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764
P.2d 985, 989-90 (Utah 1988).
Here, the trial court initially awarded QED the full amount of its attorneys' fees,
but it later reduced that award by 25%. (R. 1570-75, 2138 ^ 18.) The trial court based
that reduction on its application of equitable estoppel principles to the November 13,
2001 joint check, which is explained above. The court reasoned that because QED's
recovered only a percentage of the recovery it sought (albeit a large percentage), the
amount of attorneys' fees it may recover should be proportionally reduced. (See id.) As
explained above, however, the trial court's application of equitable estoppel principles to
the November 13, 2001 joint check was an abuse of discretion: QED should have been
allowed to recover the full amount of the November 13, 2001 joint check from the Bond.
Thus, if this Court reverses the trial court's equitable estoppel ruling and allows QED to
recover the full amount of the November 13, 2001 joint check, this Court should employ
a "flexible and reasoned approach" and award QED the remaining 25% of its attorneys'
fees. Indeed, any other result would constitute legal error. See Dixie State Bank, 764
P.2d at 991 (noting that once a trial court determines the amount of attorneys' fees to
which a prevailing party is entitled, "it commits legal error if it awards less than the
reasonable fee to which the successful litigant is entitled"). Indeed, this Court should
22

award QED all of its fees in any event: the trial court found that all of QED's attorneys'
fees were reasonable (R. 2139 ^j 20), and it therefore abused its discretion in failing to
award QED all of those reasonable fees. See id. This Court should remand the trial
court's calculation of attorneys' fees and instruct it to award QED all of the fees and costs
that the trial court previously determined were reasonable.
HI.

QED IS ENTITLED TO 18% INTEREST ON ITS ATTORNEYS5 FEES
AND COSTS.
Although USF&G acknowledges that this action is an action against the Bond, its

position regarding the interest rate governing QED's award of fees and costs reflects its
failure to fully appreciate the significance of the nature of this action. The payment bond
statute provides that "[a] person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this
section for any unpaid amount due him." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis
added). Thus, the absence of a contract between USF&G and QED is of no consequence
in determining the interest rate applicable to QED's fees and costs award. The contract
between QED and Atlas defines the applicable rate, and USF&G's obligation under the
payment bond statute requires it to compensate QED for whatever Atlas failed to pay
pursuant to Atlas's contract with QED. Indeed, pursuant to the Bond, USF&G agreed to
compensate QED for any sums that Atlas wrongfully failed to pay QED. (PA-1.)
USF&G cannot now escape its obligation under the Bond by arguing that it never agreed
to the terms of the agreement between QED and Atlas.
Here, the contract between QED and Atlas allows QED, in litigation, to recover its
costs of collection as well as its attorneys' fees. (PA-4.) It also provides for an 18%
interest rate on all sums due and owing to QED. (Id.) Thus, if QED were to sue Atlas
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and prevail, it would be allowed to recover 18% interest on the entire amount recovered,
including fees and costs. Thus, USF&G must, pursuant to the bond statute and the Bond
itself, compensate QED for "any unpaid amount due." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56504(4). In other words, by virtue of its obligation as a surety, USF&G must pay 18%
interest on QED's award of attorneys' fees and costs.
It is true, as USF&G points out, that pursuant to section 15-1-4 "a judgment
rendered on a lawful contract shall. . . bear the interest agreed upon by the parties." Utah
Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (emphasis added). It is also true that this is not an action on a
contract, but against the Bond, and that section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not directly govern this
issue. However, the tangential import of section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not mean that the
interest rate applicable to QED's award of fees and costs cannot be defined by any
contract. Section 15-l-4(2)(a) pertains only to judgments arising from contracts between
parties to litigation; it has nothing to do with judgments against sureties arising from
payment bonds. Seeking nevertheless to make some hay from 15-l-4(2)(a), USF&G
argues that because section 15-l-4(2)(a) does not govern the interest rate applicable to
QED's fees and costs award, the default rate applies. That argument ignores the other
statutory provisions that govern the applicable interest rate, and it is tantamount to
arguing that section 15-1-4 simultaneously governs and does not govern the interest rate
applicable to QED's fees and costs award.4

4

QED's reference, in its opening brief, to section 15-l-4(2)(a) as the "relevant" statute
was correct: it indeed governs the interest rate on judgments arising from actions on
contracts, and had QED obtained a judgment against Atlas, QED's judgment would have
borne an interest rate of 18%. The amount of any judgment that QED could have
obtained against Atlas is precisely the amount that QED should recover against USF&G.
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In any event, Utah Code section 15-l-4(3)(a), on which USF&G hangs its hat,
does not govern this issue either. By its plain terms, that provision only applies "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a). Here, law otherwise
provides: the payment bond statute unambiguously allows QED to recover from USF&G
"for any unpaid amount due." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4). The amount due QED is
the amount specified in its contract with Atlas: attorneys' fees and costs at an 18%
interest rate. That is what USF&G, as the surety, owes QED.
In fine, despite USF&G's recognition of the nature of this action, it ignores the
significance of that nature. The trial court erred by applying a 6.37% interest rate to
QED's award of fees and costs. This Court should remand to the trial court with
instructions that the trial court apply the 18% post-judgment interest rate, which is
consistent with QED's contract with Atlas, to the award of fees and costs.
IV,

QED SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
QED requested an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal in its opening

brief. (See Br. of Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 50.) USF&G does not appear to
dispute this, nor could it. As the prevailing party to the action below, in addition to those
attorneys' fees and costs already awarded, QED is also entitled to all attorneys' fees and
costs incurred on appeal, assuming that it prevails on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 6356-38(6) (renumbered 63-56-504(6)) ("In any suit upon a payment bond, the court shall
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. . . ." (emphasis added)).

USF&G has erroneously assumed that QED's statement that section 15-l-4(2)(a) was the
"relevant" statute means that it governs this Court's resolution of this precise issue.
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Accordingly, QED's judgment against USF&G should be augmented to include all
attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm QED's Amended Judgment against USF&G in the
amount of $307,412.74, but it should reverse the trial court's application of equitable
estoppel. Specifically, this Court should conclude that: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by applying equitable estoppel principles to this case, (2) erred by reducing
QED's attorneys' fees award, and (3) erred by not awarding QED 18% interest on the full
amount of QED's Judgment against USF&G. Accordingly, the Court should award QED
an additional $34,259.43, along with all its attorneys' fees in prosecuting this matter,
including attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §6356-504(6), and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
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